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Case No. 20150217-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
COLORADO STEVEN IRWIN, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals frmn an order of restitu.tion follm,ving convictions 
for burglary and theft by receiving stolen property, both third degree 
felonies. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-4-
103(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Colorado Steven Irwin broke into a watch shop and stole 102 watches. 
He pleaded guilty to burglary and theft by receiving stolen property. The 
trial court ordered restitution in an amount that accounted for the full retail 
value of the stolen watches. 
Did the trial court properly calculate restitution based on the retail 
value rather than the replacement cost of the watches Irwin stole from a 
retail store? 
Standard of Review. While the trial court's interpretation of the 
relevant restitution statutes is reviewed for correctness, its application of 
those statutes in ordering restitution is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See 
State v. Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, ,r 5, 353 P.3d 179; State v. Garcia, 866 P.2d 
5, 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "A trial court will be deemed to have abused its 
discretion only if no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by 
the trial court." Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, ,r 5 (internal quotation marks 
01nitted) (alteration in original). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code§ 77-38a-102 
Utah Code§ 77-38a-301 
Utah Code§ 77-38a-302. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal involves Irwin's challenge to the amount of restitution 
ordered by the trial court. Irwin burgled a watch shop, stealing 102 watches 
-2-
and then attempting to sell them. 1 R2. After Irwin pleaded guilty to 
burglary and theft by receiving stolen property, the court ordered him to 
pay restitution in full. R86:7, 12. The court later held a hearing to determine 
the restitution amount, which it set at $35,155.48 based on the retail value of 
the watches. R75; 85:14. 
This case arose out of events that occurred on May 23, 2013, when 
someone shattered the glass door of a watch shop in Sandy, Utah, unlocked 
the glass display cases, and stole 102 Rockwell watches with retail values 
ranging from $79 to $2,500 apiece, along with several sizing kits, tools, and 
spare parts. R29, 33-34, 43. Later that night, Irwin was arrested while 
selling watches out of the h~unk of his car at a pub in Salt Lake City. R43. 
After police read him his Miranda rights, Irwin acknowledged that he 
knew the owner of the watch shop, and that the two had had a falling out. 
R44. Irwin was the ex-boyfriend of the owner's daughter and had 
previously worked at the watch shop. R29, 43. 
On July 16, 2013, the State charged Irwin with one count of theft by 
receiving stolen property, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
1 There is no evidence about whether the retailer got back any of the 
watches. Irwin's insistence on Ihniting the restitution award to 
"replacement cost" effectively concedes that the only restitution at issue 
concerns watches that Irwin permanently deprived the retailer of. 
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section 76-6-408, and one count of burglary, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code section 76-6-202. Rl. Irwin pleaded guilty to both 
counts, with the theft-by-receiving count amended to a third degree felony. 
R38; 86:4, 7. Irwin also agreed to pay restitution. R38. 
The court sentenced Irwin on November 27, 2013, to two concurrent, 
suspended terms of O to 5 years in prison, with two suspended $5,000 fines. 
R48-49. The court ordered Irwin to pay restitution "in full," in an amount 
to be determined. later. R49; 86:12. Irwin was then placed on probation and 
released to federal custody for processing on federal charges. R49. 
On November 25, 2014, the State filed its motion for restitution, along 
with several supporting documents. R56-62, 63. Those documents 
included a spreadsheet from the retailer's insurer.2 The spreadsheet 
showed that, based on the Manufacturer's Suggested Retail Price ("MSRP"), 
the value of the 102 stolen watches totaled $39,004; using the wholesale 
price, the value totaled $19,244. R61-62. The insurer calculated the total 
value of the retailer's losses at $35,155.48, though the basis of that lower 
2 The record refers to the victiin as both the watch shop and the owner 
of the watch shop. R30, 56, 75. The State thus uses the term "retailer" as 
encompassing both. 
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calculation is not clear. R60. Due to policy limitations, the insurer paid the 
retailer only $6,250.48 on its claim. R57. 
At the restitution hearing, the State asked the court to set restitution 
at $39,004, with $6,250.48 paid to the insurer and the balance paid to the 
retailer. R63; 85:4-5. In the alternative, the State asked the court to use the 
insurer's valuation: $35,155.48. R85:4-5. The State argued that retail value 
is the appropriate measure of the value of stolen retail goods and that using 
a lower estimate would not compensate the retailer for lost opportunity 
costs. R85:12-13. 
Irwin argued that the watches should be valued based on the 
replacement cost. R35:11-12. A spreadsheet submitted to the court with a 
victim impact statement calculated the replacement cost at $13,651.40, 
which was less than the value calculated using the wholesale price. 3 R34. 
The court agreed with the State and, using the valuation provided by 
the insurer, it ordered restitution in the amount of $6,250.48 to be paid to the 
insurer and $28,905 to be paid to the retailer, totaling $35,155.48-the lesser 
of the two amounts the State asked for in the first place. R65:14; 75, 77. The 
3 The record does not explain how the replacement cost was 
calculated or why it was lower than wholesale price. 
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court entered its order on March 10, 2015, and Irwin timely appealed. R77-
78. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly ordered restitution based on the retail value 
of the stolen watches rather than the replacement cost. The restitution 
statute authorizes restitution for pecuniary damages defined as all 
demonstrable economic injury that could be recovered in a civil suit for 
damages, including the fair market value of stolen property. Looking to 
cases involving conversion, a general rule quickly emerges: The fair market 
value of converted property is determined by retail value rather than 
wholesale value or replacement cost. Although exceptions are not 
uncom1non due to the flexible nature of property valuation, exceptions 
must be supported by record evidence showing why the general rule is 
inappropriate. Unless the underlying facts of the case clearly indicate that 
retail value would be an inappropriate measure, the State satisfies its 
burden to present prima Jacie evidence of fair market value when it presents 
evidence of retail price; the defendant is free to rebut that evidence. 
Here, the State satisfied its burden by presenting evidence of the 
MSRP for the watches. Using that valuation as the starting point, the trial 
court then ordered restitution using the more lenient valuation provided by 
-6-
the insurer. No record evidence suggests any reason to depart from the 
general rule that retail value should be used to assess pecuniary damages. 
While Irwin argues that the MSRP evidence is problematic and does not 
reflect the amount needed to make the retailer whole, Irwin's argument fails 
because it is based merely on the theoretical possibility that the MSRP- i.e., 
the prima facie evidence of retail value-might not reflect actual retail value. 
Furthermore, the trial court accounted for any theoretical problem with the 
MSRP evidence by using the MSRP only as a starting point to determine 
retail value and ultimately adopting the insurer's valuation that was 10% 
less than the value indicated by the MSRP. 
Irwin's arguments about the restitution order constituting a windfall 
for the retailer and punitive damages against Irwin are premised on the 
success of his argument that replacement cost is the proper measure for 
damages involving theft from a retail store. Because that premise is wrong, 
Irwin's corollary arguments necessarily fail. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ORDERED 
RESTITUTION CALCULATED ON THE RETAIL 
VALUE OF THE WATCHES IRWIN STOLE FROM A 
RETAIL STORE. 
Irwin contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it 
determined the value of the stolen watches based on the retail value rather 
-7-
than the retailer's replacement cost. Irwin argues that this resulted in a 
windfall recovery for the retailer and the equivalent of punitive damages 
imposed on Irwin. Aplt. Br. 6-16. 
On the contrary, the trial court properly determined the value of the 
retailer's loss. Retail value, rather than wholesale value or replacement cost, 
is the generally accepted measure of loss in cases involving theft or 
conversion. Irwin has pointed to no evidence that would justify departure 
frmn that general rule. The trial court properly imposed a retail-price 
recovery for Irwin's theft from a retail store. And the court properly 
founded its award on evidence of the MSRP. 
A. Retail value is the generally accepted measure of loss 
in cases involving theft or conversion. 
The Crime Victims Restitution Act ("the Act") authorizes a court to 
impose restitution as part of a defendant's criminal sentence "[w]hen a 
defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-301 (West 2004); id. § 77-38a-302(1) 
(West Supp. 2015). The Act serves compensatory, deterrent, and 
rehabilitative purposes, State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ,r 18, 214 P.3d 104, and 
it "should be liberally consh·ued to accomplish the purpose of making crime 
victims whole for the harms they suffer because of a defendant's criminal 
conduct," State v. Wadsworth, 2015 UT App 138, ,r 13, 351 P.3d 826 (internal 
-8-
quotation marks omitted). Thus, "[t]he appropriate measure of the loss or 
damage to a victim is fact-sensitive and will vary based on the facts of a 
particular case." State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ,r 15, 82 P.3d 211. Trial 
courts are therefore "granted flexibility in determining damages in order to 
'fashion an equitable award to the victim."' Wadsworth, 2015 UT App 138, 
iI 13 (quoting Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ,r 14); see also Henderson v. For-Shor 
Co., 757 P.2d 465,469 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("[R]ules relating to the measure 
of damages are flexible, and can be modified in the interest of fairness." 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
The trial court properly exercised that flexibility when it required 
Irwin to pay restitution calculated from the retail price of the watches he 
stole. The Act specifically recognizes that fair market value is included in 
the "pecuniary da1nages" the restitution order should cover. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-38a-102(6) (West Supp. 2015) (stating that pecuniary damages 
"includes the fair market value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or 
otherwise harmed"). Under the Act, courts look to analogous civil causes of 
action to define fair 1narket value. See id. (limiting "pecuniary damages" to 
"den1onstrable economic injury ... which a person could recover in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal 
-9-
activities"); State v. Brown, 2014 UT 48, ,r,r 22-23, 342 P.3d 239 (looking to 
civil law to determine what damages are allowable). 
The relevant civil-action analogue to Irwin's theft is conversion. Like 
theft, conversion "is an act of wilful interference with a chattel, done 
without lawful justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived 
of its use and possession." Firkins v. Ruegner, 2009 UT App 167, ,r 5, 213 
P.3d 895 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
In conversion cases involving property that has not been returned, the 
usual measure of damages is fair market value at the time of the conversion. 
Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 2004 UT 59, ,r,r 26, 28, 96 P.3d 893; 
Henderson, 757 P.2d at 468. "Fair 1narket value is measured by what the 
owner [ of the property] could expect to receive, and the amount a willing 
buyer would pay to the true owner for the stolen item." Ludlow, 2015 UT 
App 146, ,r,r 6, 8 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
accord Henderson, 757 P.2d at 468. 
As a general rule, "the legal definition of that price is retail, not 
wholesale." Winters v. Charles Anthony, Inc., 586 P.2d 453, 454 (Utah 1978); 
accord In re Estate of Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969, 982 (Utah 1996); see also 
Firkins, 2009 UT App 167, ,r 8 n.6 ("'[M]arket value is usually 1neasured with 
refererlce to retail value in a relevant market .... "); Henderson, 757 P.2d at 
-10-
468 ("Market value is defined as the price for which the property is bought 
and sold at retail in the marketplace .... "); Ault v. Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117, 
1121 · (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("Market value is equal to the retail price if the 
item is marketable."). 
Using retail price as the measure of restitution imposed on a 
conviction for theft is also consistent with criminal statutes in general. 
Retail value is the standard measurement for purposes of grading theft 
charges. See State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811, 812-13 (Utah 1977) (determining 
the value of stolen property based on retail value rather than replacement 
cost); Morris v. State, 334 P.3d 1244, 1248 & n.13 (Alaska Ct. App. 2014) 
(collecting cases from other jurisdictions); see also Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, 
,I 6 (relying on a criminal gradation case to define fair market value for 
purposes of restitution). 
Further, the retail price is the only value most likely to make a theft 
victim whole. The theft deprives the victim of the benefit he intends to reap 
from the goods - their sale. On the other hand, using replacement cost- the 
measure Irwin advocates-1nay well fall short. The ainount of the victim's 
loss is to be detennined at the time of the theft. See Henderson, 757 P.2d at 
468. But several months, if not years, may pass between when a theft occurs 
and when restitution is ordered. What is more, it may take the defendant 
-11-
several years to fully pay restitution, during which time prices very well 
may fluctuate. If the retail price falls, using replacement cost effectively 
shifts the time of valuation from the time of theft to the time of repayment; 
if the wholesale price rises, "replacement cost" is insufficient even to replace 
the stolen property. In either situation, paying the dated replacement cost 
of the watches will not make the victim whole. And while it is possible that 
the retailer may not have been able to sell all the watches at or around the 
time Irwin stole them, that was a risk Irwin assumed when he decided to 
steal the watches. Cf Winters, 586 P.2d at 455 (upholding use of retail price 
to measure damages in conversion case "notwithstanding the fact that a 
dealer may choose to sell the item above or belm-v: that value"). 
Likewise, using replace1nent cost would effectively give thieves a 
wholesaler's discount, encouraging further thefts in lieu of legitimate retail 
purchases. Suppose a thief steals a $1 candy bar from Walmart and eats it. 
Requiring her to pay back the wholesale price of 50¢ would create the 
incentive for further theft. Now suppose the thief steals a 1nore valuable 
ite1n, such as a $5,000 television, and sells it to someone else. Requiring her 
to pay back the wholesale price of $2,500 would create an even greater 
incentive for further theft as a means of acquiring goods at a wholesale 
-12-
price. The thief has in essence purchased the stolen goods at a price 
unavailable to the general public. 
Irwin asks this Court to apply a valuation that is not recognized in the 
law, for replacement cost is not a substitute for retail value.4 Haycraft v. 
Adams, 24 P.2d 1110, 1112-13 (Utah 1933); Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, ,r,r 8, 
12; see also Winters, 586 P.2d at 454-55 (noting that "market value and 
replacement cost ... are not entirely synonymous concepts," and basing its 
analysis on retail value despite the fact that retail price and replacement cost 
happened to be the same in that case). Rather, replacement cost may at 
most be used as "a starting point," a means to estimate fair market value 
when no better evidence is available. Haycraft, 24 P.2d at 1112; accord 
Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, 112; Ault, 739 P.2d at 1121-22. In such 
circumstances, replacement cost can provide '"a basis from which to draw 
inferences about the market value of the stolen item,"' as long as some 
evidence ties replace1nent cost to retail value. Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, 
,r 12 (quoting Grimes v. Comm., 749 S.E.2d 218, 221 (Va. Ct. App. 2013), aff'd 
764 S.E.2d 262 (Va. 2014)); see also Haycraft, 24 P.2d at 1112. And as 
4 An exception to this rule applies when there is, in fact, little or no 
market for the stolen goods. Haycraft v. Adams, 24 P.2d 1110, 1112 (Utah 
1933); Ludl01.v, 2015 UT App 146, ,r 8. Irwin does not argue that that 
exception applies here, nor does it. 
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explained below in subpart B, there was a more accurate means to estimate 
fair market value using retail price. 
In appropriate cases, the facts may justify departure from the general 
rule of relying on retail value. For example, wholesale value may be the 
appropriate measure of damages when the owner of the property is a 
wholesaler, see Barry v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co., 189 P. 70, 72 (Utah 1920), or 
when the property is merely damaged but not taken or destroyed, see 
Angerman Co. v. Edgemon, 290 P. 169, 173 (Utah 1930) (treating market value 
as synonymous with retail value while upholding the trial court's valuation 
of negligently damaged property based on wholesale value). But using 
wholesale value would be inappropriate in a conversion claim brought by a 
retailer such as the one from which Irwin stole the watches. See Alta Indus. 
Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1290-91 (Utah 1993) (quoting section 911, 
comment d of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) to the effect that a 
retail dealer may recover the wholesale value of property, but noting that 
different rules apply when dealing with the tort of conversion); State v. 
Islam, 344 P.3d 22, 26 (Or. Ct. App.) (affirming the use of retail price to 
measure the value of jeans stolen off the shelves of Macy's because II the 
market in which the goods were being traded was the retail market" 
-14-
(internal quotation marks omitted)), review allowed, 357 P.3d 503 (Or. 2015). 
And Irwin did not merely damage the watches; he took them. 
Other circumstances justifying an exception to the general rule of 
using retail value may include the nature or nonexistence of the market, the 
condition of the goods, or other factors. See, e.g., Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, 
1 8 (noting that some consumer goods, such as used clothing, may have 
"little or no market"); Watkins v. Ford, 2010 UT App 243, ,r,r 6-7, 20, 239 P.3d 
526 (implying that MSRP may not have reflected market value because of 
fluctuations in the market), aff din part and rev' din part, 2013 UT 31, 304 P.3d 
841, as amended (Aug. 6, 2013); Firkins, 2009 UT App 167, ,r 8 & n.6 (noting 
the "unique" nature of the property as a reason to look outside the typical 
market to assess value); Henderson, 757 P.2d at 468-69 (using retail price as a 
baseline measurement and adjusting the value to account for depreciation 
due to the goods' used condition); Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Crail, 281 U.S. 57, 65 
(1930) (determining that wholesale price was the more accurate measure of 
actual loss under the facts of that case, which involved "fungible goods sold 
by quantity"); Morris, 334 P.3d at 1249 (noting that "the reality of the 
market" may involve the retailer customarily selling goods at a discounted 
price); State v. Hall, 304 P.3d 677, 682 (Kan. 2013) (remanding for the trial 
court to reconsider the amount of restitution when the record abounded 
-15-
with facts indicating that retail price may not be the appropriate measure, 
such as the fact that some of the stolen goods were merely used by the 
merchant as supplies rather than sold to its customers). But Irwin does not 
identify evidence that any of those circumstances apply here, nor do they. 
While the State bore the initial burden of producing prima facie 
evidence of fair market value, Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, ,r 11, evidence of 
retail price satisfies that burden in the typical case, Morris, 334 P.3d at 1248 
(assessing value for purposes of grading a criminal charge).5 See also State v. 
Carter, 544 S.W.2d 334, 339 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) ("'[I]n the absence of any 
evidence to the contrary, evidence of retail price is not only admissible but 
is perhaps the best evidence of market value."' ( quoting Maisel v. People, 442 
P.2d 399, 401 (Col. 1968))). Once the State met its burden, Irwin had the 
opportunity to "rebut the presumption that the retail price of an item 
represents its market value by offering evidence" of facts demonstrating a 
5 In State v. Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, 353 P.3d 179, the prosecutor's 
evidence of original retail price was held to be insufficient prima facie 
evidence of fair market value. Id. ,r,r 3 & n.1, 5, 11-13. But the problem 
with the prosecutor's evidence in Ludlow was one of timing: The prosecutor 
had established retail value at the time of the victim's initial purchase of the 
property, but the prosecutor had not presented any evidence to connect that 
initial price to the fair 111arket value of the used, depreciated goods at the 
time of the theft. See id. Here, there is no dispute that the insurer's 
valuation and the MSRP reflect the time of the theft. The only dispute is 
over the propriety of using those figures as opposed to the replacement cost. 
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reason to depart from the general rule. Manis, 334 P.3d at 1249; accord Com. 
v. Hanes, 522 A.2d 622, 628 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); State v. King, 396 A.2d 354, 
356-57 (N.J. App. Div. 1978); People v. Irrizari, 156 N.E.2d 69, 71 (N.Y. 1959). 
He did not do so. 
Ultimately, the valuation of property is left to the discretion of the 
judge. Cf Harris, 519 P.2d 247, 248 (Utah 1974) (noting that market value 
"usually" means retail value, but ordering a new trial because the trial court 
instructed the jury that it must accept retail value in determining the market 
value of stolen property). "The primary objective in rendering an award of 
damages for conversion is to award the injured party full compensation for 
actual losses[.]" Henderson, 757 P.2d at 469. Thus, the trial court is given 
broad discretion to apply a "flexible" measure of damages to the facts of 
record, so that it may "fashion an equitable award to the victim." Corbitt, 
2003 UT App 417, ,r 14. The basic standard, however, should be retail value, 
and departure from that general rule should be justified by the record. 
Irwin did not justify departing from the general rule. 
B. The trial court acted within its broad discretion by 
using the State's unrebutted Manufacturer's 
Suggested Retail Price evidence as a basis from which 
to establish retail value. 
The State provided evidence of retail price sufficient to satisfy its 
burden to establish a prima facie case of the value of pecuniary damages 
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suffered by the retailer. It presented evidence of the MSRP for each of the 
102 stolen watches, thus establishing retail value. R61-62. In addition, the 
State presented evidence of the wholesale price as well as the insurer's 
valuation of the stolen watches, which was nearly $3,900, or 10%, less than 
the value calculated using MSRP. R61-62. Ultimately, the trial court 
adjusted the value downward to coincide with the insurer's more 
conservative estimation after the State conceded that doing so would be 
reasonable. R85:4, 14. 
Irwin challenges the reliability of the MSRP evidence. Aplt. Br. at 10-
12, 19-20. He argues that, by its nature, MSRP values are merely 
"aspirational," for "[v]olatile market forces and a lack of consumer demand 
may ... prevent an ite1n frmn selling for its MSRP value." Aplt. Br. at 11. 
Irwin also argues that there was no evidence of any lost opportunity costs 
or that the retailer "was in the business of selling watches, or that it would 
have attempted to sell the watches had the watches not been stolen." Aplt. 
Br. at 19. Because the MSRP values exceeded the retailer's actual loss, Irwin 
argues, the restitution order constituted punitive da1nages and granted a 
windfall to the retailer. Aplt. Br. at 12-16. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-
102(6) (stating that "pecuniary damages" "excludes punitive or exemplary 
da1nages and pain and suffering"). 
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Irwin's argument regarding MSRP evidence fails because it depends 
on a factual challenge to the strength of the MSRP evidence that has no 
support in the record, and that Irwin withheld until this appeal. Irwin did 
not present any evidence below challenging the accuracy of the MSRP as a 
measurement of retail price. The State satisfied its burden of presenting 
prima facie evidence of the retail value of the stolen watches. While Irwin 
could have rebutted the MSRP evidence by presenting evidence of the 
watch market in Salt Lake County, the condition of the watches, or the 
retailer's sales history or that of nearby watch shops, he chose not to. See, 
e.g., Morris, 334 P.3d at 1248-49 ( discussing the respective burdens for 
proving value in criminal cases). The theoretical possibility that a retailer 
111ay sell property "above or below" retail value does not render 
inappropriate the use of retail price to measure damages. See Winters, 586 
P.2d at 455 (upholding use of retail price to measure damages in conversion 
case "notwithstanding the fact that a dealer may choose to sell the item 
above or below that value"); accord Islam, 344 P.3d at 23, 26 (affirming the 
use of retail price to 1neasure the value of stolen jeans even though the state 
did not present evidence that the merchant would have sold the jeans had 
they not been stolen). Rather, some evidentiary basis must be present to 
justify departure from the general rule of using retail value. And Irwin's 
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supposition that MSRP is merely "aspirational" does not show that it is an 
improper estimate of the retail value, especially where, as here, the court 
reduced that valuation by 10%. 
As a corollary to his argument that MSRP is inappropriate, Irwin also 
argues that the trial court abused its discretion by basing its valuation of the 
stolen watches on the retailer's lost opportunity costs, such as lost profits. 
Aplt. Br. 16-20. Irwin argues that lost opportunity costs are too speculative 
and the causal connection too attenuated to support the restitution order. 
Aplt. Br. 17-20. 
Irwin's argument blurs the distinction between general damages and 
special damages. "General damages are those which naturally and 
necessarily result from the harm done. They are damages which everybody 
knows are likely to result from the harm described and so are said to be 
implied in law." Cohn v. ]. C. Penney Co., 537 P.2d 306, 307 (Utah 1975); 
accord Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ,r,r 20-24 (Orme, J., concurring). Special 
damages, on the other hand, "'are more or less peculiar to the particular 
plaintiff and would not be expected to occur regularly to other plaintiffs in 
similar circumstances."' Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, if 20 (quoting Dan B. 
Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies§ 3.2, at 138-39 (West 1973)); see 
also Cohn, 537 P.2d at 307-08. "In the case of conversion, ... the measure of 
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general damages is the value of the chattel at the time and place of 
conversion," Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ,r 24 (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)- in other words, retail value. See Islam, 344 P.3d at 
25-26 (noting that failure to present proof of lost profits does not preclude 
use of retail value to measure recovery in conversion or restitution cases). 
Because general damages "are presumed by, or implied in, law to have 
resulted" frmn the injury, Cohn, 537 P.2d at 308 (internal quotation marks 
omitted), the State has satisfied its burden to establish that the injury arose 
out of Irwin's crintlnal conduct by proving that the retailer owned the 
watches, that Irwin stole them, and that the watches were valued as being 
salable on the open market for $39,004. Nothing more is needed here to 
prove that Irwin's theft deprived the retailer of that value. See State v. 
Brown, 2009 UT App 285, 'if 11, 221 P.3d 273 (discussing the causation 
standard for restitution cases). 
Here, the trial court based its restitution order only on general 
damages, not special damages. In announcing its decision, the trial court 
said it was persuaded by the prosecutor's argument that when someone 
steals from a retail store, "restitution is the price [at which] it's posted." 
R85:14. In stating that "lost opportunity would be the manufacturer's 
suggested retail price," R85:13, the trial court was simply acknowledging 
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that there was no need to independently calculate lost opportunity costs, 
such as lost profits, in determining the value of the stolen property. Rather, 
retail value necessarily incorporates a retailer's lost opportunity to sell 
goods, cover operating costs, and earn profits-all as general damages that 
naturally and necessarily flow from the theft of goods from a retailer. The 
State did not seek and the trial court did not award "'special damages over 
and above the value of the converted property."'6 Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ,r 24 
(quoting Lilenquist v. Utah State Nat'l Bank, 100 P.2d 185, 190 (Utah 1940)); cf 
Osteen v. State, 616 So. 2d 1215, 1217-18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming 
a restitution order covering the value of stolen property but reversing that 
portion of the order covering additional business expenses for which the 
state had not established the appropriate causal connection). And as shown 
in subpart A above, setting restitution based on retail value is well 
established. 
Irwin's remaining arguments are unfounded. While he asserts that 
the record contained no evidence that the retailer "was in the business of 
6 Restitution based on special damages involving lost profits may be 
appropriate in smne cases. See Cohn, 537 P.2d at 307; Corbitt, 2003 UT App 
417, ,r 25; People v. Chappelone, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 895, 910, 911 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(requiring specific evidence of lost profits when stolen merchandise was 
returned to the victim). 
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selling watches, or that [he] would have attempted to sell the watches had 
the watches not been stolen," Aplt. Br. at 19, a letter attached to the victim 
impact statement referred to the watches as having been stolen from "my 
watch company." R29. The watches were kept in "locked display cases." 
R29. When the trial court asked at the restitution hearing whether there was 
any dispute that the watches were new, Irwin's counsel responded that the 
watches were "stolen fro1n a business." R85:14. The most reasonable 
inference for the fact finder to draw was that the retailer was in the business 
of selling watches on the retail 1narket. Cf State v. Waldron, 2002 UT App 
175, ,r 16, 51 P.3d 21 (stating that a jury, as the fact finder, is entitled to 
"draw reasonable inferences from [the] evidence"). 
Irwin's argument that the restitution order constitutes a windfall for 
the retailer and punitive damages for Irwin is premised on the success of his 
argument that replacement value is the appropriate measure of pecuniary 
damages. Because the retailer's loss was appropriately measured by retail 
value, as reflected in the MSRP, the retailer did not receive any windfall, nor 
can the damages be classified as "punitive." To the contrary, the court, with 
the State's consent, limited restitution to the lower of the two fair-market-
value figures the State offered. The award was lenient, not punitive. 
-23-
CONCLUSION 
Given the broad discretion trial courts have to fashion an equitable 
restitution award, Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ,r 14 (majority opinion), and 
given the lack of any evidence warranting departure from the general rule 
of using retail price to measure pecuniary damages, the trial court properly 
based its restitution order on the retail value of the stolen watches. And this 
Court cannot say that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by 
the h·ial court when it worked from the unrebutted MSRP evidence to 
calculate that figure. See Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, ,r 5. This Court should 
therefore affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on December 4, 2015. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attornev General 
,I 
WILLIAM M. HAINS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
Addendum A 
Utah Code Annotated§ 77-38a-102 Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Conviction" includes a: 
(a) judgment of guilt; 
(b) a plea of guilty; or 
(c) a plea of no contest. 
(2) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted 
or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to 
the sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal 
conduct. 
(3) "Department" means the Department of Corrections. 
(4) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on 
the condition that a defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program, 
make restitution to the victim, or fulfill some other condition. 
(5) "Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a 
prosecution. 
(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all dem.onstiable econom.ic injury, whether or 
not yet incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the 
facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the 
fair market value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, 
and losses including lost earnings and medical expenses, but excludes punitive 
or exemplary damages and pain and suffering. 
(7) "Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the prosecution and 
defendant setting forth the special terms and conditions and criminal charges 
upon which the defendant will enter a plea of guilty or no contest. 
(8) "Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution 
and defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, 
or any agreement by which the defendant may enter a plea in any other 
jurisdiction or where charges are dismissed without a plea. 
(9) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the 
prosecution and the defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from 
the defendant but not, at that time, entering judgment of conviction against him 
nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that he comply with specific 
conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement. 
(10) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the 
prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions 
upon which, following acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be 
held in abeyance. 
(11) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest from 
the time of sentencing, insured damages, reimbursement for payment of a 
reward, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or 
transportation and as may be further defined by law. 
(12)(a) "Reward" means a sum of money: 
(i) offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and conviction 
of an offender; and 
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this information, 
except that the person receiving the payment may not be a codefendant, an 
accomplice, or a bounty hunter. 
(b) "Reward" does not include any a1nount paid in excess of the sum offered 
to the public. 
(13) "Screening" means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate 
investigative action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution 
that has been commenced, or cause a prosecution to be diverted. 
(14)(a) "Victim" means any person or entity, including the Utah Office for 
Victims of Crime, who the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a 
result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(b) "Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice. 
@ 
@ 
@ 
Utah Code Annotated§ 77-38a-301 Restitution--Convicted defendant may be 
required to pay 
In a criminal action, the court may require a convicted defendant to make 
restitution. 
Utah Code Annotated§ 77-38a-302 Restitution criteria 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court 
shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in 
this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make 
restitution as part of a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim has 
the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(14) and in determining whether 
restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as 
provided in Subsections (2) through (5). 
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and 
court-ordered restitution. 
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim 
for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal 
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the 
time of sentencing or within one year after sentencing. 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as 
provided in Subsection (5). 
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under 
this part, the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court 
record. 
( 4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the 
restitution, the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(S)(a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall 
include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court 
or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that 
involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, 
includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the 
course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss 
or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and 
devices relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care 
and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized 
by the law of the place of treatment; 
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and 
rehabilitation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense 
resulted in bodily injury to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost 
due to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were 
owned by the victim and were essential to the victim's current employment 
at the time of the offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in 
the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered 
restitution, the court shall consider; 
(i) the factors listed in Subsections (S)(a) and (b); 
(ii) the financial resources of the defendant, as disclosed in the financial 
declaration described in Section 77-38a-204; 
(iii) the burden that payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the 
other obligations of the defendant; 
(iv) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or 
on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(v) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and 
the method of payment; and 
(vi) other circumstances that the court determines may make restitution 
inappropriate. 
( d)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (5)( d)(ii), the court shall determine 
complete restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all 
restitution orders at the time of sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one 
year after sentencing. 
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court 
within one year after sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons 
and Parole. 
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, 
refer an order of judgment and commitment back to the court for 
determination of restitution. 
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ROCKW8LL 
8677 South 
Highland Drive, 
Sandy,UT 
84093 
www.ROCKWELLTIME.com 
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Account Name: 
Address: 
Buyer Contact: 
Phone: 
Email: 
NOTES: Watches stolen at break.in 
Style Name SKU# DiaUAccent Color 
AP101 While 
AP102 Black 
AP103 Red 
the APOSTLE AP108 While 
AP109 Black 
AP110 Black 
AP113 Rose Gold 
AP114 Rose Gold 
AS101 R1.-d 
AS104 White 
the ASSASSIN AS105 Black 
AS106 Black 
AS108 White 
AS112 Gunmetal 
the Brooklyn BK101 I White/Diamonds BK102 Black/Diamonds 
CF101 wnite 
the CARBON CF104 Red 
FIBER CF108 Black 
CF109 White 
CM111 While 
CM112 Black 
~e COMMANDE" CM113 Red CM114 Blue 
CM115 Brovm 
CM117 Rose Gold 
the CME108 Black CME108 Gold CotllMANDER CME110 Black ELITE 
CME111 White 
CT101 While 
CT102 Black 
CT103 While 
CT104 Gunmetal 
The Cartel CT105 Gunmetal 
CT106 Rose Gold 
CT107 Black 
CT108 WhlUJBlack 
CT109 Rose Gold 
CT110 Purple 
DT101 While 
DT102 Black 
DT103 RedArovle 
DT104 White/Black Bezel 
the DUEL TIME DT105 Black 
DT108 Black 
DT109 GravAmvle 
DT110 Gold 
DT114 White/Sliver Bezel 
I FF101 Silver FF102 Black 
Band Color 
Black Leather 
Black Leather 
Black Leather 
SUverMetal 
Sliver Metal 
Black Metal 
Rose Gold Metal 
\NhlteLeather 
Black 
White 
Black 
Black Print 
While/Gold 
Gunmetal 
White Ceramic 
I Black Ceramic 
Blaek 
Black 
Phantom 
While 
snver 
Sliver 
Sliver 
Sliver 
Silver 
Rose Gold 
Sliver/Black 
Gold/Black 
Black/Black 
Black/White 
Sliver 
Black 
White Leather 
Gray Leather 
Gunmetal 
Rose Gold 
Black Leather 
White Leather 
Black Leather 
Black 
Silver 
Silver 
Silver 
Black/Sliver 
Black Ceramlc/Slvr 
Black 
Black Ceramic/Slvr 
Gold 
Black/Sliver 
Silver/While Ceramic 
Silver/Black Ceramic 
Emall:Amy@cabanagroup.net 
•• '. • • J • ~. • • • • ' 
...... 
·t ·Watches: ;$,;-. ,. •·'•··· :as;oo4;D0 • 
Total Pieces 102 
Est. ShlpplnQ Calculated Upon Fulfillmenl 
Other: 
Account#: 
Order Date: 
PO#: 
Terms: 
Rep Name: 
Wholesale MSRP Qty Extension 
$ 65.00 $ 130.00 1 $ 130.00 
$ 65.00 $ 130.00 1 130.00 
$ 65.00 $ 130.00 1 130.00 
$ 90.00 $ 180.00 2 360.00 
$ SO.DO $ 180.00 1 180.00 
$ 110.00 $ 220.00 1 220.00 
$ 130.00 $ 260.00 1 $ 260.00 
s 80.00 s 160.00 1 $ 160.00 
$ 52.50 $ 105.00 1 105.00 
$ 60.00 $ 120.00 1 120.00 
$ 60.00 $ 120.00 1 120.00 
$ 60.00 $ 120.00 1 120.00 
$ 77.50 $ 155.00 1 155.00 
$ HO.DO l!i 160.00 1 1an.oo 
I IS BOO.CO I$ 1 600.00 9i 
-
I IS BOO.DO $ 1600.00 1 s 1 600.00 
s 120.00 $ 240.00 1 $ 240.00 
$ 120.00 $ 240.00 1 s 240.00 
$ 185.00 $ 370.00 1 $ 370.00 
$ 120.00 $ 240.00 1 $ 240.00 
$ 170.00 $ 340.00 1 $ 340.00 
$ 170.00 $ 340.00 1 $ 340.00 
$ 170.00 $ 340.00 1 -$- 340.00 
$ 170.00 $ 340.00 1 $ 340.00 
$ 170.00 s 340.00 1 s 340.00 
$ 190.00 $ 380.00 1 $ 380.00 
$ 425.00 $ 850.00 1 $ 850.00 
$ 425.00 $ 850.00 1 $ 850.00 
$ 600.00 $ 1,200.00 1 s 1,200.00 
$ 500.00 $ 1,000.00 1 s 1,000.00 
$ 115.00 $ 230.00 1 s 230.00 
$ 140.00 $ 280.00 1 $ 280.00 
$ 90.00 $ 180.00 1 $ 180.00 
$ 95.00 $ 190.00 1 s 190.00 
$ 140.00 $ 280.00 1 $ 280.00 
$ 160,00 $ 320.00 1 $ 320.00 
$ 95.00 $ 190.00 1 $ 190.00 
$ 95.00 $ 190.00 1 $ 190.00 
s 105.00 $ 210.00 1 $ 210.00 
$ 130.00 $ 260.00 $ . 
$ 220.00 $ 440.00 1 $ 440.00 
$ 220.00 $ 440.00 1 $ 440.00 
$ 240.00 $ 480.00 1 $ 480.00 
$ 240.00 $ 480.00 $ 
-
$ 290.00 $ 580.00 1 $ 560.00 
$ 310.00 $ 620.00 1 $ 620.00 
$ 290.00 $ 580.00 1 $ 580.00 
$ 325.00 $ 650.00 $ . 
$ 240.00 $ 480.00 1 $ 480.00 
$ 500.00 $ 1,000.00 $ 
-
$ 500.00 $ 1,000.00 $ 
-
Replacement Cost 
$ 45.50 
$ 45.50 
$ 45.50 
$ 126.00 
$ 63.00 
$ TI.DO 
$ 91.00 
$ 56.00 
$ 36.75 
$ 42.00 
$ 42.00 
$ 42.00 
$ 54.25 
$ 56.00 
$ 
$ 560.00 
$ B4.00 
$ 84.00 
$ 129.50 
$ 84.00 
$ 119.00 
$ 119.0D 
$ 119.00 
$ 119.00 
$ 119,00 
$ 133.00 
$ 297.50 
$ 297.5D 
$ 420.00 
$ 350.00 
$ 80.50 
$ 98.00 
$ 63.00 
$ 66.50 
$ 98.00 
$ 112.00 
$ 66.50 
$ 66.50 
$ 73.50 
$ 
$ 154.00 
$ 154.00 
$ 168.00 
$ 
$ 203.00 
$ 217.00 
$ 203.00 
$ 
$ 168.00 
$ 
$ 
0000033 
FF104 Black Black/Black Ceramic $ B00.00 $ 1,600.00 1 
FF105 Black Black/White Ceramic $ 800.00 $ 1,600.00 1 
FF107 Rose Gold/Black ~ose Gold/Black Ceramic $1,250.00 $ 2,500.00 1 
the50 Round FF108 Red Sliver $ 400.00 $ 800.00 
FF109 Green Sliver $ 400.00 $ 800.00 
FF110 Gold Gold/White Ceramic $ 1,250.00 $ 2,500.00 
FF111 Blue SRver $ 400.00 $ 800.00 
FF112 Gunmetal/Blue Gunmetal $ 800.00 $ 1,600.00 1 
FF113 Sliver snver $ 400.00 $ 800.00 
FS101 While Sliver $ 150.00 $ 300.00 1 
FS102 Black snver $ 150.00 $ 300.00 2 
the 50mm FS103 White Black $ 200.00 $ 400.00 1 FS104 Black Black $ 200.00 $ 400.00 1 SQUARED FS105 Whlle Gold $ 250.00 $ 500.00 1 
FS110 Gunmetal Gunmetal $ 225.00 $ 450.00 1 
FS222 McGrath Gunmetal $ 350,00 $ 500.00 
RGF101 While White $ 39.50 $ 79,00 
the Game Face RGF102 Black/Gray Black $ 39.50 $ 79.00 RGF103 Black/Red Black/Red $ 39.50 $ 79.00 
RGF105 Orange/Grey Grev/Oranae $ 39.50 $ 79.00 
MC101 Pink White Uhr $ 47.50 $ 95.00 1 
MC105 Phantom Black Lthr $ 52.50 $ 105.00 1 
MC106 White/Black White Lthr $ 52.50 $ 105.0D 1 
MC107 Pink/Black Black Llhr $ 52.50 $ 105.00 1 
MC108 Blue/Black Black Llhr $ 52.50 $ 105.00 1 
MC109 Green/Black Blacklthr $ 52.50 $ 105.00 1 
The Mercedes MC110 Red/Black Red Lthr $ 52.50 $ 105.00 1 
MC112 Orange/Black Grav Lthr $ 52.50 $ 105,00 1 
MC113 White/Gold Whllellhr $ 57.50 $ 115.00 1 
Mc115 Blue/Brown Brown/Uhr s 47.50 $ 95.00 1 
MC118 Red/Black Blackllhr $ 52.50 $ 105,00 1 
MC12D PU!llle White Lthr $ 47.50 $ 95.0D 1 
MC121 Purple Black Llhr $ 52.50 $ 105.00 1 
MC123 Yellow Black lthr $ 52.50 $ 105.00 1 
RCL101 While While $ 54.50 $ 109.00 
RCL102 Black Black $ 54.50 $ 109.00 
RCL103 Red Black $ 54.50 s 109.00 
Rider Coliseum RCL104 Green Black $ 54.50 $ 109.00 
RCL105 Blue Black $ 54.50 $ 109.00 
RCL106 Red Red $ 54.50 $ 109.00 
RCL107 Purple White $ 54.50 $ 109.00 1 
RIR101 While White $ 160.00 $ 320.00 1 
RIR102 Black Black $ 160.00 $ 320.00 
RFT101 White WhlteHRM $ 60.00 $ 120.00 1 
Rider RFT102 Black BlackHRM $ 60.00 $ 120,00 1 
RKN102 Black Black $ 40.00 $ 80.00 1 
RKN103 Red Red $ 40.00 $ 80.00 1 
RKN104 BlackfRed Grev $ 40.00 $ 80,00 1 
t<K :n vvnne suver 1,t .111 240.00 , 
RK102 Black Silver 120.00 240.00 1 
RK103 Red Silver 120.00 240.00 1 
RK104 Fade s11ver 120.00 240.00 1 
the ROOK RK105 Green Sliver 120.00 240.00 1 
RK106 Red/Blk w Diamonns Black 200.00 400.00 2 
RK108 Plaid GunMetat 162.50 325.00 1 
RK110 Blk w Gm accenl Black 180.00 380.00 1 
RK112 Black/Black Diamonds .. , .. ,, .. 2000D 40000 1 
;:,r-·1u1 vvntle suver lllL.50 ;m:i,00 2 
SF102 BlaCK Silver 182.50 365.00 1 
SF103 Red Sliver 182.50 365.00 1 
tho-747- SF104 White Black 202.50 405.00 1 
SF105 Black Black 202.50 405.00 1 
SF106 Black/Green Black 202.50 405.00 1 
SF107 Blue Silver 182.5D 365.00 1 
747 Swiss Elite : ~::~~J : 1:113CK I BlacKT~nver S 1 :mu.00 I l:li ~ ~1n1.1n I 1 I saver I Sliver I 1$ 500.00 I IS 1 000.00 I 1 
I VNlUl I I vvn1te I uvmte unr I 1$ 45.DU I I$ 90,00 I 1 
the Vanessa I VN102 Black I Black Llhr s 45.00 I I :Ii 90,00 I 1 I VN103 Pink I White Llhr s 45.00 IS 90.00 I 1 
I VN104 I I \A1nite I Brovm Ltnr I I$ '15.00 s 90.00 I 1 
1Tota1·p1eces j • ·· · foij-
;.;.fn;addilion.to}ffie;waitices·ori;disoiav,,all lhe.tools.and spare parts (i.e. liks; clasps, pins) were taken alonn wilh our.sizinn tools. 
Slifntfklts'cost$20-ancl.olhertoos-aro $8:981toia1;.:••y · · · 
•--;~::~r:;'.:~;~_:~-~~:·.~~·~~:~::::~~-::::~:~::~:.~~-~,,,,~!'•·· 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$· 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
s 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
:6 
s 
:!i 
:Ii 
s 
$ 
1,600.00 
1,600.00 
2,500.00 
-
-
-
-
1,600.00 
-
300.00 
600.00 
400,00 
400.00 
500.00 
450.00 
-
-
-
-
-
95.00 
105.00 
105.00 
105.00 
105.00 
105.00 
105.00 
105.00 
115.00 
95.00 
105.00 
95.00 
105.00 
105.00 
-
-
-
-
-
-
109.00 
320.00 
-
120.00 
120.00 
80.00 
80.00 
80.00 
2 
-~ 
-
.0 
,U 
~-
90,UD 
90.UU 
::IU,UU 
>tu.~o 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
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$ 
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$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
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$ 
$ 
$ 
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$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
390041 $ 
~ 
560.00 
560.00 
875.00 
(i) 
560.00 
105.00 
210.00 
140.00 
140.00 G) 
175.00 
157.50 
(ii) 
33.25· 
36.75 
36.75 
36.75 
36.75 
36.75 
36.75 
36.75 Q 40.25 ' 
33.25 
36.75 
33.25 
36,75 
36.75 
Q 
38.15 
112.00 
42.00 
42.00 
28.00 
28.00 
28.00 
84.00 
64.00 
84.00 
84.00 
84.00 
280.00 
113.75 
126.00 
140.00 
255.50 
127.75 
127.75 
141.75 
141.75 
141.75 
127.75 
875.00 
350.00 
31.50 
31.50 
31.50 
31.50 
·13:651.40·1 y 
0000034 ~ 
AddendumC 
AddendumC 
~: 
~ -
FARMERS 
INSURANCE 
MID CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY 
INSURED: 
CLAIM#: 
IRON HORSE MANAGEMENT dba ROCKWELL TIME USA 
3000053731-1-3 
POLICY#: 605137215 
DATE OF LOSS: 05/23/13 
STATEMENT OF LOSS 
ITEM DESCRIPTION Total 
COVERAGE: LIMITS: 
Business Personal Property $1,000,000.00 
LOSS AS DETERMINED; 
Business Personal Property 
1. Watches highlighted in blue per worksheet - per item value is $100 or < $ 3,541.50 
not subject to the $2,500. 
2. Watches highlighted in green per worksheet - per item value is > $100 $ 15,702.50 
is subject to the $2,500. 
Limit $ 2,500.00 
Excess over che limit $ 13,202.50 
3. 10 New sizing kits $ 200.00 
4. Sizing tools $ 8.98 
Total $ 35,155.48 
Deductible $5,000 retained in excess over the limit amount not covered 
Net Claim 
Notes: 
RCVw/ limit 
$ 
- $ 3,541.50 
$ 2,500.00 
$ 200.00 
$ 8.98 
$ . $ 6,250.48 
$ 
-
$ 6,250.48 
0000060 
I 
RDCKW[3LL 
l'A-"cccc.:co.:cu;_:11.c..l N=on-"l-"c+: --------------- ---------+--'·W=ola.:c,;,:h:;:;c:.s:'l'-'c"S:..... __ _;;_ • 3:c9:.:,0;:.0:..t.;_:,,::;00=--l l'-·~-._~-a...,,='--=Cr0,',L"'U,:,:M,:.N:.:S::,·,:_A;:D:.:D=:,E=;:D,;--___ -I 
Address: Total Pieces · 102 " ,, ::,,- ·• ' .• - .... 
Extension :.j ;r ·. l,tc'Jl.ii : : , · · Items 
1-..:S;,:l'i,,:l:.c,:,:N.:;om=c--i-::,:S';::K~U:ii#::!°f;-,;lt.,:iDC:'l;:;ol:"IA~c:::c~cn,::l'::C:.;o'i:lo~r--+,,, 1 :,-:.,;B;,:•~ni::d~C~o~lo;:.r~,,..f~frV:,:V;.:h;;;ol::,c,iso.,lc:-f--f..,,,-.:;M,:,:S;:,R;;,P=+,_;Q;_;l.!.y-f'.,,--'E::x;.:l::cn,:,:>:;;io,.;n:,,.,~ 40% or 50% of,W! . $100 or< · > $100. 
-
! S -"-65'00, S 130,00 ' ' 1 S 130,00 > bo,uu •• ,•·t . · •/ o , ,:uu. 
. . the APOSTLE 
;'._~;st~:=-:~[:t:~~~:t·=!j·:t==t;;~~j:~~oj:_ ~-j::-=t_j~: :::::;j;~~j:~~~ ! ~~.~~m~ . -~~;~0: 
•s- 90:00· s 100.00 • 2 s- 3so.rnJ > 180.00 "a;;:o:;;,,,:;:;:.,-1------! 
' 1,s -· 90.00, S 180,00 ,, 1 ' S 1SO,OO :, 90.UU !>F'·, • ·"'·wd.,,""",+-----l 
' , S :'f:88:00 ' $ 220,00 Ir. 1 S 220,00 > 88,00, 0:,; ,;.., C":ts'.88, -
lS. 130.00, •. S 260.00 •, 1 ,, S 260,00 S 130,00 . , , i •. 1JU,OO 
._ ____ _.,.=:..:."'- ;s, ao.oo, s 150 oo ,, 1 · · s 1so.oo :, so.oo ·•~~., eu.uu., · 
S Ol,50 -SJ'•'' .,. b~,50 S 60,00 ,u, 
~~t::::::tboj,oj,o:t, f,ut-ti =::::::j 
S 60,U0: IU 1-~;...---;;,1,.:·_,;.;,o~,tt-' ;,:,,;;~~1-----,J 
r------,,--,,==.,.,..-r,-:-:-,,,,,-,::,,--.,---;,,=e,,;,,.,,'-;;,;.;..-,-,,,,;,,,.,,.-.,,,,=;,:c,=,-,--,,-::---:-=.:,,,,;=-"--+-::- ----1 !-~,,.S-----~-: -+ __ ,_·_-·-_···- ---,l-,s"'-···7-,; '"':-·~"'._. _-,,,.. ~ 
1i'CF101 V ,..,.. 15:--c ~•Whmr,,.- -,I .\I •....:: Blackl -~l di::-111.Sli ~96~0D~I Is 240;00 I ,: 1 s 
the CARBON . Cff104\111bJ1• --~ ·,;;-.Red" ') ·4.p - .;_-.,.,;Block~.... . ~ J1\Sr'.."'~'!BS;oo I i i$ 240,00 I 1""· s 
FIBER b 'CF,100¾I1?;" .I . ~ ~ BlaCk:---:.i!:.. ~ l'.~:<.Phuntom. ~ I 1~1 s 105:00"1 
li,~CF-109.!llJ.:....M n.-• -•Whlh),:.~ ··' .-.::1--~- .. :~- Whltoi'H et,I '.f."' }S~ G'.OOH 
· I $ 
q S-
370.00 I 
240,00 I 
1 - s 
,-.,. s 
-
s 340,00 .. ',, s 
s 340,00 I . •1• * .s 
s 340.00 ,, ,l ' $ 
s 340,00 1.·., ,, s 
s 340.00 ,1 ,$ 
s JB0.IJ0 ,1 $ 
tho I CME-106,1.>."": I'.- ~ f31t\Clk.r' · .,:;r?",,....,l S/IVot/Blao~. :-:'l.-:-jj:.:. ... 1 S 425:oor -·~-~= 
COMMANDER 1' CME10S'IP.K>< --yGol= = ~ ·· ' Go1d/61oc!Gs..' ~l(..;1!$ I 425,00ll 
ELITE l'i'GME1110 1$-'[lt' t:c=::c .::-Blac1< ,...,.-t:~ l~..:.1·,,,:. 81nck/81ock<'", -.JL 5 1~S;S600.00i l, 
IJCMEHi;l'.!;hl~'..t=iWltlla'.: -- -~-1 - ~ Olnck!WhUo~ ...... . 1•s· : SOO,OOrl 
s 650.oo I .. ,.~ s 
s 850,00 I' 1 , s 
IS 1,200,00 I. ,,. $ 
' IS 1 000.00 I 1, ·s 
-
., 
';"'CTrtO·f \ l ·x,t_f:Whlh1;.io ---::- ~•.lSll-.,Afl; J ,.t..;. 'S , •:92i00' s 23(1.00 1' 5 
,,CT-107.• le· -:,· ,i,61nck,_ ~· ,.<~~ ,.,, Sloe!< - '- ... ,, i!, ' S ""-140,00 
1
"'CT103 ,,,., 1,, - ,.,Whlla ., While Leolhei" Fi' s,,. 90.00'. 
s 260,0-0 1 s 
s 180,00 1 s 
The Car1cl 
-
ti " G ·1 ~,= GmUfoitlhorr.-· S o"95,00 
-;;, ·, : " Gtinma1e11 __ , -u: S · 140:00 
.;: ~ RoSo·Go!d~-:::·-, 1s s':...: 1smoo 
~ - t'"1"·JBlack.1Leathor-~""" ... ·,- .s~ -95.00: . 
s 190.00 ,., s 
s 280,00 1 s 
s 320,00 1 s 
$ 190,00, . ,1. s 
5 190.'10 _J i;:..; . $ 
;;:;on09~ 1if_.J ,t; ...l' ..; Roso_GQld • ~~ (L__Blacif [ oather~ - 1rs -~,,84.00~1. s 210,00 - 1 s 
l ,::'Cl,110" l lh ·2 1Pumla"r.-..,-_ ·--~:.:..JSlor:~ ~ ''"' ~,, 130.00~1 s 260,00 ,. s 
DT109 ·: J, GrevArnvl•."' BlaokC-Oromlc/Slvr: •, ," 1$ "290:00 S 580.00 1· S 
•0Ti10. ,_. ~.;,, - Gold -~ = • ';•~ Gold y-!c', - S ' 325'.00S S 650,00 S 
, OTl14 , ·,,, Whlli>/Sllvor, 8nzal>, •· >fllncl</Sllvnr, ,,' "· S ' ,2,10.00 S 460.00 • 1 S 
•·FF.101 ,, 
""~ l Silvor.:-~ • .., :Sllvor/Wh\lo.Cormnlo•I,, .. s •;·4.500:00: s 1.000.00 ,.,, -
~ FF102 ,, , . Black -· ~snvor/Slock,Gornmlc, ,, ·s 500,00 ' s 1,000,00 
I,'' f.fi1()4 C -,,. ... .q ~81:tck-:: .. •:";·=:' ~ 8/ucl<./Btoc•k:<::ornn\fc.:. I'· .. ·s-:·aao:oo·- $ 1,600,00 
,t;"FF105fl 
" 
f.__~:.. ,,c,:;..- Black~ :,,; . Block/While' Ceramic I• ·s · aoo,oo' s 1,600,00 
:,c l,F107 1->,Ruso,Gold/Bl<iek"Fc tosn GoldJBlnck Cornrnio"ii:; ,s 1,2so.oo· 
-S 2,500.00 
tho 50 Round ,Ff109 
"' " 
Rodr ·• ,- _..,_"Sllvor· 
' 
rS ·r.400:00, , s 600,00 
•• ·1 
,, FF109'- tt"' :r•.~~Groon ,~. ~ _.-::~., Silver ,;;,. C·r 
-
s 400.00 s 600,00 5 
l"· FFl,10_ .,,, 
" Gold I,$ GofdfWhito Coronl/Q~ '" S' 11 250;00; s 2,500.00 , 
',FF111 ( 
"' 
.•Blue,>¼'< ,, x'Sllvor 
,. 
ri:... $ 400:00 s 800,00 
I S,ff.112 
- · · - Gunm8taU81ue GunmelaJ:'.' l.·',;lf"!': ·s 800,00' s 1,600,00 
-., s 
1,,.• s 
.,.F F1:13'" I --s11vor:· ,,~-
' " 
· ~;!-~ ~-;S!lvo1 ~ 1.:. 
' 
tS•"'400.00, s 800,00 
. , 
.rs,01 ,, , _ )Whllo, , ,. · ',(Sih'Gr.5 ~ __. ·s'1". 160;00; S JOO.UO " '1 S 
•
0
• • - Sliver• .c.cd -•s s· 150.001 S 300.00 2 ·• S 
,,._ - ' Block< >, s ·-·200:00 S 400.00 1 S 
240,00 
140,00 
370,00 
240.00 
'340,00 
J,l0,00 
340,00 
340.00 
340.00 
J B0 .00 
850.00 
U50,00 
1,200.00 
1 000,00 
2:10.00 
280.00 
180,00 
190,00 
280,00 
,320,00 
190,00 
19000 
210.on 
•"10,00 
440,00 
480,00 
. 
S80.00 
620,00 
580,00 
. , 
480,00 
1,600,00 
1 600,00 
2 500.00 
1,000,00 
. 
:roo.oo 
600,00 
•oo.oo the 50mm 
SQUARED 
.CFS103 · r ·-· ' Whlla > ' 
'',FS104 . ·~ ... : ~ Block"if. .--,e.: 
1 ··F.S105 11- ' ~ -···'."_While :: • • ""'""'""' Block . :ii · · ;,,r>_· .~1-"s _~ .:2"'0""0,"'oo::.·~- +'s'---'4""0"",o"'o'-+-- ' -+-'s'-__ ....;;== ,. .,, Gold 1$ ' . 250,00. S 500.00 1 S 400.0U !i00.00 
~·FS1-10.,. ::'. Gunmetan.~ . 
~ FS222 ,ifl ·· MCGfnUit ----:;;: 
'Gunmolal 
- 'Gi.lnmotal 
S '7225.001 l 
'S ,,ss0,00' 
S 450,00 1: S 
S 500.00 ,.. S 
450.00 
- , - , ~ ,.w11110, ~ ,..,1,, ,, ,,s , 39:50,1 rs 79.0o I $ 
t co , -~- 1: -= .... - ? 9Iack• .. ,A'\ P A -.If$, !<--39~50•1 I S 79.00 L- , ,:. ._ ~ s 
l ic Gurne Fa Gt""+/.;,~•.;_ ..... urnck/Hod:__ ..:.J I~::- •.HS~ 39:!iOd" rs 79,0U I ,,, s 
;;:~ h Gr0v/Ornnn0 ···-· F- l:S 39.50' 1 ,~ 79.00 I s 
-
. 
. 
. 
•• - · - + • - • 
I. MC101- I. ,, ~ ,M..Pink 
-
. I,... · •..._,..~ Whlte Llhr __ · · ,,Ls , 
·47.50 I I S 9~.co 1 , . s 
I MC105 . ~ Ph:mtom ,. I · .Blacli Llhr • 'I $ 52,50 I I s 105 co : $ 
95.00 
105.00 
~ 800,00 ,$ , , 800,00 
~ 96,00 ~5 ~~~l: ,·,9o,ITTl· , 
s 96:uo ' S _5c:,~,-U6.00k 
" 
'H,;,.OU :s .1~5.00 
$ 96,00 f,:i ,r.,, 96,Q0r 
":, 170,00 
· ,!l ""'-'" _110.00: 
~ 110,00 if v ). -t.1?6.i5'G 
s li'u.mf , S•e,r. .:1i.o.oo_ 
s 170,00 ~. ~· ,_ 110.uo, 
s 1/U,OU -s---. <;.,.·,~110.00 
s 190,00 "$ '" 190,00 
s . -s 
s 44!5.UO s 
' 
425.U0 
s 4:t5.00 :r ·; - 41',00 
> tiUtl,OU ·$• ,, , ,,1,00,00 
• j lJ0,00 ' ' $ ..., ~m.oo 
• 92,00 • " . ~2.UV ! $ 140,00 ' s 140,00 
:; 9D,00 •~:-
" 
~o.oo, 
s 95,00 ' Sr 
' 
o5:6o 
s 140,00 •$ '.'"-140,00 
1 1S0,00 1, $ 160,00, 
$ 95 ,0 U i~: . .i--t:~9;;,:0U_i 
s 95,00 ~ ,::..:;_~ !,JS:.OOj 
,s 84.uu -~ .;-:;,._.:,-,..."""'U,"l tUU, 
s $ _·£ ~- :_ . 
:; 22u,ou . :-,,,. 220.00 
s 220,00 ' :tLo.00, 
s 240,UO 
· ·:-•.\.24ll,OO 
s , '' ~.~~---~ 
·s 2~0.0U 
--~~ 290,00 
' 
310,00 :;::,, . ,310,00, 
s 290,00 :o · t,• · 29(1,00 · 
s . "~ ,;..:.~'.i ~:~ .. ~-· . 
s ~40,00 
-~· 240,00 
s $ . ,' 
s s ', ~.-: . ·., . 
s 600.0u ~ ' 800,00 
s 600.00 ' $:• ..... ,,oo-
·s 1,:.t.:,u.ul) .. ' d ,260,UO 
~ ' ~ -,. • . ,.•-w 
s 
.' fS: .. ,··," · 
~ ,,, 
. ;.: ~ ,. 
5 
-L~, i on=oo. :, 6Ull,UU 
s $ ' . 
i s 150.0U s :• ~'L 150:uo 
> ~i5o.ilu ~
20U DO ~ -=.-:-. 200,00, 
200,00 $· ,.,. · 200.00 
250,UU ~~ -~- · 250.oo~ 
n ,.oo $ .. ...:,....:';>? 'i.00. 
-~ .-:•..:c• 
~ ) <::,;-;,· ...... \ 
$ 
·~ - 'V'· .. ,ii·' 
5 
-
,s 
.a-·N 
s :~· ...... '"':' ... ... . -~-
s 47.50 ~ , .. ·t1r.~o ; 
s :>2.:>0 ·, .. 
"' ~2-~0 
OOO(H3~:n 
• 
• 
• 
• MClOG Whllo/Blnr.k WhllD Llhr s 52.50 s 105.00 1 s 105.00 $ 52.SU s 52.50 
MC107· Pink/Block Olock LO,r s 62,50 s 105.00 I s 105.00 s 02.50 •. ,u 
MC108 
-
Block Llhr s 52.50 s 105.00 1 s 105.00 $ 52,50 •. ,u 
MC109 Blocl<Lllv s 52.60 s 105.00 1 s 105.00 ~ :,Z,50 •. ,u 
MC110 Red Llhr s s2:50 s 105.00 1 s 105.00 ~ 52.50 .,u The Mercedes 
MC112. G1ov ~lhr ,s 52.50 s 105.00 1 s "105.00 5 52.50 . ,u, 
M0113' Whllo/Gold• · Whl1o·Llhr s 57.50· s 115.00 1 s 115.00 s 57.00 ... • ,u 
Mc115 Bluo/Browll Brcr,m/1.thr s 47.50 s 95.00 1 s 95.00 s 4/,:,0 ~ •• o 
MC118' Rod/Blnck Block llhl s 52.S0 s 105.00 1 s 105.00 s 52.50 i·' :2,50 
MC120· Purnlo WhllD Llhf s 47.50 s 05,00 1 s 05.00 s 4/.00 4f.OU 
MC121 Putnlo BlacUUtr s 62.50 s 105.00 1 s 105.00 5 :,2.0U ... ::,i,::,u 
MGl?.3. Yo!low Block Llhr s 52.50 s 105.00 1 s 105.00 ) 02.50 . 02.00 
RCL101 Wlllte Whllo s 5'1.50 s 109.0U s . . 
RCL102 Bl•ck Block s 54,50 s 109.00 s . 
·,RCL103 Rod Bloc)(• s 54.50. s 109.00 s = . 
Rider Coliseum RCL104 ,Groon Blnck s 54.60 s 109.00 s 
RCL105 Bluo Black .s 54.50 s 109.00 s 
RCL100 Rod Red s 54.50 s 109.00 s ~ . 
RCL107 Putl'.llO Whllo s 54,50 s 109.00 1 s 109.00 J "4.00 54.:,o 
RIR101 WhllD Wl111o · s 160.00 s 320.00 I s 320.00 £ 160.00 s 160.00 
RIRI02 Blnc!c Block s 160.00 s 320.00 s $ ~ . s 
R~'T 101 Whlto WhltoHRM s 60.00 s 120.00 1 s 120.0U ~ 60.00 s 60.00 
Rider RFT102 Block BlocKHRM s 60.00 s 120.00 I s 120.00 • 60,UU ~ b0.00 
HKN102 Bloalc B!nck~ s 40.00. s 80.00 1 s 80.00 $ 40.00 s •u.uO 
RKN103 Rod Rod s <0.00 s 80.00 I s 80.00 s 40.0U s 40,00 
RKN10d Blnck/Rod GrtW s 40.00 s 80.00 , s 80,00 :; 4U.UO s 4U.uu 
• 
RKI01 Whllo Silver s 96.00 ' s 240.00 1 s 240.00 :; 9o.uu • s6.uu 
RK102 Black· Silvor s 96.00 s 240.00 , s 240.00 s ~6.00 s 96.00 
RK103, Hod Sllvor - s 98.00 s 240.00 1 s 2~0.00 s ,n;.oo s 00,UU 
l<K104 Fade Sliver . s 96:00 s 240.00 I s 240.UO s !lo.00 • Sb,UO 
the ROOK RK105 Grcon Sliver s 98.00 s 240.00 , s 240.00 s 9b.OO s SD.VU 
RK106 Rod/Blk w Olamonds Block. s 200.00 s 400.00 2 s 800.00 s <OU.00 • 4UU,W 
RK108 Plnld Oun Motel s 162.50 s 325.00 1 s 325.00 • 10,.ou • 
,.,.,u 
RKI IO Olk w Gm nccont Block s 180.00 s 360.00 I s 360.00 s 180.00 • 100.00 
RK112 Blnck/Blnck Oinmond~ Bloc~ s 200.00 s 400.00 I s 400.00 ~ ,uv.00 ~ 2UV,UU 
SF101 w,,110 SIWOr s 182.50 s 365.00 2 s 730.00 • .,0:>,00 • ~b:>.VU SF102 Blnck Si1'1er s 182.SO s 365.00 1 s 305.00 182.50 s 10,.ou 
SF103 Rod Sliver s 182.::i0 s JGS.00 1 s 365.00 182,:,0 s 182.ou 
lhc ,747. SF104 Whllo Blncl< s 202.50 s 405.00 1 s 405.00 202.50 s 202.00 
SF105 • Block Bloc~ s 202.50 s 405.00 1 s 405.00 LuL.aU ~ 202.50 
SF100 Blncl<IG,oon Block s 202.50 s , OS.CO 1 s 405.UO LU ,OU Is <V<,00 
SF 107 Blun Silvor s 182.SO s 305.00 I s 365.00 • 1U2.5U s 182,50 
747 Swl55 Elite I SFElOl I I ~look I Blnci"JSilvor I S 1.250.00 I s 2.500.00 1 s 2 500.00 ~ 1,2, 0.uu • ,.2~0.00 I SFE103 J I Sll\!Or I Silvur I I S 500.00 I s 1.000.00 I 1 s 1 000.00 s >vv w • ~vu.oo 
I VN101 I I WhllO I WIIIIO Lthr s 46.00 I s 90.00 1 s 90.00 s 4>,UU • 4b,UU 
the Vanoss:1 I VN102 I I Block I Bloc!< LUir I s 45.00 I s 90.00 1 s 90.00 ~ 40.00 ' S 4 0.0U 
I VN103 I I Pink I Whllollhf s 45.00 I s 90.00 I s 90.00 s 40.0U -~ 40.UU 
I VN104 . I I Whlte I S,o-..,it llhr I s JS.00 I s 9000 , s 90.00 s 40.00 ·S 4>.00 
IIsug1 eh,!it"' I irn s 39,004.00 ( 10 ?M nn ~ • s41 sn s 1~7no,n 
In addition lo lho walhces on disolav, au lhe tools and spare parts (i.e. Ilks. dasps, pins} wura l;;ikun nlona \..;th our sizina tools. 
Sizinp kits cost $20 and other loo?; nro S8.9R lobtl. ~ 
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AddendumD 
SIM GILL, #63 89 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
WILLIAM J. CARLSON #11528 
Deputy District Attorney 
8080 S. Redwood Rd., Suite 1100 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
(385)468-7546 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
RESTITUTION ORDER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Case No. 131401107 
COLORADO IRWIN, 
Defendant Judge Charlene Barlow 
THE COURT, having allowed defendant a full hearing on restitution in compliance with 
Utah Code Ann §77-38a-202(4), hereby orders the Defendant to pay $35,155.48 as follows: 
$6,250.48 shall be paid to Farmers Insurance and $28,905.00 shall be paid to Iron Horse 
Mangaement c/o Jeff Horsley. Adult Probation and Parole shall establish the payment plan for 
Defendant as a term of his probation. 
DATED this ___ day of ______ , 2015. 
March 09, 2015 09:52 AM 0 0 0 0 0 7 51 of 2 
March 09, 2015 09:52 AM 
Judge Charlene Barlow 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
@ 
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